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hirty years ago, the U.S. Supreme 
Court recognized that criminal 
defendants have a constitutional 
right to represent themselves. 
Since that time, both academics 
and the popular media have been fascinated 
by, and almost uniformly critical of, the 
decisions of pro se defendants to represent 
themselves. 
Dr. Jack Kevorkian, Colin Ferguson, 
Congressman James Traficant, John 
Muhammad and, most recently, Zacarias 
Moussaoui all tried their hands at self-rep-
resentation with seemingly disastrous (and 
highly publicized) consequences. 
Colin Ferguson, for example, who was 
convicted of opening fire on the Long Island 
Railroad and murdering several people, rep-
resented himself throughout his trial and was 
sentenced to 200 years in prison. During his 
opening statement, he rambled incoherently 
about a vast conspiracy against him, asserting 
to the jury that the only reason there were 
93 counts in the indictment was because the 
year was 1993. 
The media circuses surrounding these 
cases, combined with the ludicrous court-
room behavior of at least some of the defen-
dants, has led to a perception that defendants 
who represent themselves are foolish at best 
and mentally ill at worst. 
Are these well-publicized pro se defen-
dants representative of all pro se defendants? 
Or to put it another way, are pro se defen-
dants necessarily either crazy or foolish? The 
answer is that we simply cannot know for 
sure without looking at empirical data. 
In the past five years, the importance 
of this empirical question has taken on 
increased significance because the Supreme 
Court, troubled by the possibility that pro se 
defendants are ill-served by the decision to 
represent themselves, has called into ques-
tion the wisdom of continuing to recognize a 
constitutional right to self-representation. 
After conducting an empirical study of 
pro se felony defendants, I conclude that 
these defendants are not necessarily either 
ill-served by the decision to represent them-
selves or mentally ill. Instead, the data sug-
gest that these defendants have legitimate 
- and constitutionally important - reasons for 
representing themselves.
The primary argument against the right 
to self-representation is based on fairness to 
the defendant. On this view, the right to self-
representation undermines the defendant’s 
due process right to a fair trial by giving him 
a constitutional right to do something that 
ultimately can only hurt him. 
As the Supreme Court bluntly stated the 
point, “[o]ur experience has taught us that a 
pro se defense is usually a bad defense, par-
ticularly compared to a defense provided by 
an experienced criminal defense attorney.” 
The assessment that pro se representation 
in felony cases necessarily is a bad idea, how-
ever, is contradicted by the empirical data I 
collected. Although pro se defendants make 
different choices on the path to resolving 
their cases, they are not necessarily ill-served 
by those decisions. 
Outcomes in state court
In state court, pro se defendants charged 
with felonies fared at least as well as, and 
arguably significantly better than, their rep-
resented counterparts.1 
A total of 238 defendants in the sample 
of state court felony defendants (less than 
0.5 percent of the total defendants in the 
database for whom the type of counsel was 
reported) were pro se at the time their cases 
were terminated, and outcomes were pro-
vided for 234 of them. 
As set forth in Table 1, of the 234 pro se 
defendants for whom an outcome was pro-
vided, just under 50 percent of them were 
convicted of any charge (either at trial or 
by guilty plea). And of the 50 percent who 
were convicted of something, just over 50 
percent (or 26 percent of the total number of 
pro se defendants for whom an outcome was 
reported) were convicted of felonies. 
For represented state court defendants, by 
contrast, a total of 75 percent were convicted 
of some charge (either at trial or by guilty 
plea), and of those convicted, 85 percent 
were convicted of felonies. 
Thus, only 26 percent of the pro se defen-
dants ended up with felony convictions, 
while 63 percent of their represented coun-
terparts were convicted of felonies. 
Notably, although pro se defendants in 
the database were significantly more likely 
to go to trial than represented defendants, 
their acquittal rate on all charges at trial 
(5/23 or 22 percent) equaled that of the 
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Table 1: Outcomes for Defendants in State Court
Pro Se  
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3%
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4%
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48%
(113/234)
Represented 
Defendants
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(27,868/46,699)
11%
(5,202/46,699)
1% 
(542/46,699)
-- 
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24%
(11,128/46,699)
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Trial:
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Trial:
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Note: Percentages may not add to 100 percent due to rounding.
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represented defendants (542/2,501 or 22 
percent), and their 57 percent (13/23) partial 
success rate, defined as acquittal on all felony 
charges, substantially exceeded the 29 per-
cent (734/2,501) partial success rate of the 
represented defendants. 
Outcomes in federal court
Pro se felony defendants in federal court, 
like their state court counterparts, were much 
more likely to go to trial than represented 
defendants.2 As set forth in Table 2, the pro se 
defendants went to trial (usually jury trial) at 
approximately double the rate at which repre-
sented federal felony defendants went to trial. 
In terms of acquittal rates at trial, over 
the five-year period from 1998 to 2002, 65 
unrepresented defendants in the database 
went to jury trial, and five of them were 
acquitted, yielding a trial acquittal rate of 
7.69 percent (5/65). Over that same five-
year period, 7,744 defendants identified as 
being represented by counsel went to trial, 
with 1,238 acquitted, for a trial acquittal 
rate of 15.99 percent (1,238/7,744). The 
acquittal rate for represented defendants 
therefore was over twice as high as that for 
unrepresented defendants. 
Measured a different way, however, pro se 
federal felony defendants were just as likely 
to be acquitted as their represented coun-
terparts. 
Because the jury trial rate of unrepresented 
defendants was so much higher than that of 
represented defendants and because so many 
represented defendants are convicted by way 
of guilty plea, if the pro se acquittal rate is 
expressed as a percentage of the total number 
of pro se federal felony defendants, rather than 
as a percentage of pro se defendants going to 
trial, the acquittal rate for pro se defendants 
is virtually identical to the acquittal rate for 
represented defendants: five pro se felony 
defendants were acquitted out of a total of 
664 unrepresented felony defendants, for a 
0.75 percent overall acquittal rate. 
By way of comparison, 1,495 represented 
felony defendants were acquitted either at 
bench or jury trials out of 190,647 total 
represented felony defendants, yielding a 
0.78 percent overall acquittal rate. Thus, 
when viewed in the aggregate, pro se federal 
felony defendants do not seem to be faring 
significantly worse than their represented 
counterparts. 
Therefore, in both state and federal 
court, the empirical evidence undermines 
the assumption that pro se defendants neces-
sarily are ill-served by the decision to self-
represent. 
Signs of mental illness in pro 
se defendants
Those criticizing the right to self-repre-
sentation also assert that the overwhelm-
ing majority of defendants who choose to 
represent themselves are mentally ill and 
that the right to self-representation therefore 
represents only the recognition of delusional 
beliefs rather than informed and rational 
choices of the pro se defendants. 
The data refute that assertion. In fact, 
the vast majority of pro se defendants do not 
appear to exhibit any overt signs of mental 
illness. Because a defendant cannot consti-
tutionally be required to stand trial unless he 
is mentally competent, in virtually every case 
in which a defendant manifests any sign of 
mental illness, a federal district court judge 
will order a competency evaluation. 
As set forth in Chart 1 (see next page), 
of the over 200 pro se felony defendants in 
federal court that I studied, evaluations to 
determine competency to stand trial were 
requested or ordered in only about 22 per-
cent of the cases.3 Moreover, not only did 
less than 22 percent of the pro se defen-
dants receive competency evaluations but, 
as depicted, in well over half of the cases 
(26/45) in which the defendant was ordered 
to undergo an evaluation, the evaluation was 
ordered after the defendant invoked his right 
to self-representation. 
Because of the long-held assumption that 
those who represent themselves are mentally 
ill, a defendant’s decision to represent himself 
pro se even absent other indications of mental 
illness, may well give rise to a concern on the 
part of the court that the defendant is men-
tally ill. A trial court judge therefore is much 
more likely to order a competency evalua-
tion when a defendant invokes his right to 
self-representation, even absent any other 
indicia of mental illness, than she would 
be for a defendant who does not choose to 
proceed pro se. 
Counting only those defendants who had 
competency evaluations prior to the invoca-
tion of the right to self-representation, only 
19/208 pro se defendants (9 percent) were 
ordered to undergo evaluations. While this 
Table 2: Method of Disposition in Federal Court Database
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
Pro se: 75%
Represented: 88%
Pro se: 12%
Represented: 5%
Pro se: 0.5%
Represented: 0.4%
Pro se: 10%
Represented: 6%
Pro se: 2%
Represented: 0.4%
Pro se: 71%
Represented: 89%
Pro se: 9%
Represented: 5%
Pro se: 0%
Represented: 0.3%
Pro se: 15%
Represented: 6%
Pro se: 4%
Represented: 0.4%
Pro se: 86%
Represented: 90%
Pro se: 7%
Represented: 4%
Pro se: 0%
Represented: 0.3%
Pro se: 7%
Represented: 5%
Pro se: 0%
Represented: 0.3%
Pro se: 79%
Represented: 90%
Pro se: 8%
Represented: 4%
Pro se: 0%
Represented: 0.3%
Pro se: 11%
Represented: 5%
Pro se: 2%
Represented: 0.3%
Pro se: 79%
Represented: 91%
Pro se: 11%
Represented: 3%
Pro se: 0%
Represented: 0.3%
Pro se: 10%
Represented: 5%
Pro se: 0%
Represented: 0.3%
Plea of  
Guilty
Jury 
Trial
Bench
Trial
Dismissals Statistical 
Dismissals
Note: Percentages may not add to 100 percent due to rounding.
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figure may be higher than the rate of compe-
tency evaluations for defendants in the federal 
system generally, it certainly undermines the 
notion that most defendants who represent 
themselves exhibit signs of mental illness. 
Why self-represent?
Why do felony pro se criminal defendants 
choose to represent themselves if not because 
of mental illness? The evidence suggests 
that in many cases, the choice may result 
from concerns about or dissatisfaction with 
appointed counsel. 
Most significantly, nearly half of the pro 
se federal felony defendants in the database 
I created asked the court to appoint new 
counsel prior to invoking the right to self-
representation. 
This dissatisfaction appears to come from 
two sources. First, the data suggest that some 
pro se defendants are concerned about the 
quality of court-appointed counsel. 
Pro se defendants in the database I created 
were more likely to have court-appointed 
counsel than federal felony defendants as a 
whole. 
There is a substantial body of evidence 
demonstrating that states are struggling to 
provide even marginally adequate court-
appointed counsel for indigent defendants. 
Because those defendants have no right 
to counsel of their choice, self-representa-
tion is their only real alternative if they are 
unhappy with the counsel whom the judge 
has appointed. 
Pro se defendants also went to trial at sig-
nificantly higher rates than their represented 
counterparts. 
Because deficiencies in the quality of 
counsel are more apparent in the lead-up 
to trial than during the course of plea nego-
tiations (particularly since negotiating a plea 
requires less consultation with a client than 
preparing for trial), and because the stakes 
for the defendant at trial arguably are higher 
than the stakes in plea negotiations, it follows 
that overworked or substandard counsel will 
be of greater concern to defendants going to 
trial than to those taking pleas. 
The trial rate of pro se defendants there-
fore inferentially supports the theory that 
concerns about the quality of counsel may 
drive some felony defendants to represent 
themselves. 
The data suggest one other source of dis-
satisfaction with counsel - defendants’ ideo-
logical considerations. As set forth in Table 
3, pro se defendants in the database I created 
were 13 times more likely to be charged with 
tax offenses as their most serious charge than 
federal felony defendants overall. 
Tax evasion often lends itself to an ideo-
logical defense - in particular the assertion 
that the federal government lacks the author-
ity to require its citizens to pay taxes. 
Many such defendants may well believe 
that government-appointed counsel cannot 
adequately present that defense and thus 
may choose to represent themselves.
Suggested improvements
To the extent that indigent defendants 
represent themselves either as a result of legit-
imate concerns about the quality of court-
appointed counsel or because of ideological 
considerations, the right to self-representa-
tion protects the defendant’s personal right 
to defend in the way the defendant believes 
most advantageous. 
That having been said, the data also dem-
onstrate that recognizing a right to self-rep-
resentation creates opportunities for abuse 
by the state, and several modifications to 
the existing legal structure are therefore 
needed to protect the constitutional rights 
of defendants. 
First, jurisdictions need to ensure that 
the waiver of counsel in fact is knowing and 
voluntary. 
Particularly in jurisdictions where the 
sheer number of indigent defendants has 
overwhelmed the system, the court has 
an incentive to encourage or even compel 
defendants to represent themselves. But to 
the extent that defendants do not knowingly 
and voluntarily waive the right to counsel, 
their constitutional rights are violated. 
The data strongly suggest that such invol-
untary or unknowing waivers may be occur-
ring in misdemeanor cases, and some form 
of protection therefore needs to be adopted 
in order to ensure that all such waivers are 
both knowing and voluntary. 
Second, because at least some of the 
defendants who choose to represent them-
selves do exhibit signs of mental illness, trial 
judges need mechanisms to ensure that those 
defendants are knowingly and voluntarily 
relinquishing the right to counsel. 
The extent to which a trial judge can take 
account of the defendant’s mental illness in 
making the constitutional determination is 
somewhat unclear because of the Supreme 
Court’s most recent pronouncement in this 
area. Legislative action therefore may be 
needed in order to make clear that judges can 
and should consider the presence of mental 
illness in determining whether the defendant 
has knowingly and voluntarily waived the 
right to counsel. 
Finally, although there now is little 
information on the extent to which courts 
appoint standby or advisory counsel, such 
appointments can play a vital role in protect-
ing the fair trial rights of pro se defendants. 
Standards therefore should be adopted to 
ensure that courts appoint standby counsel 
as a matter of course. 
These three refinements to the exist-
ing structure will ensure that the right to 
self-representation does not infringe other 
constitutional rights.
Conclusion
The data establish that the right to self-
representation furthers the Constitution’s 
basic guarantee of fairness. 
The select few felony defendants who 
Chart 1: Competency Evaluations of Pro Se Felony 
Defendants in Federal Court
■ No Competency Screen
■  Competency Screen After  
Pro Se Request
■  Competency Screen 
Before Pro Se Request
78%
13%
9%
choose self-representation do not appear 
to suffer significant adverse outcomes from 
that decision, and the right therefore does 
not appear to infringe the defendants’ due 
process fair trial rights. 
Of perhaps even more significance, it 
appears that defendants choose to represent 
themselves not because they suffer from 
mental illness but instead because they are 
dissatisfied with counsel. 
On the mental illness point, the data 
are clear. While it is likely that at least some 
defendants choose to represent themselves 
because of mental illness, the vast majority of 
pro se defendants exhibit no signs of mental 
illness. 
To the extent that there are issues of men-
tal illness, those should be addressed through 
the waiver of counsel standard. 
The fact that some mentally ill defendants 
choose to represent themselves should not be 
the basis for questioning the legitimacy of a 
right that protects all defendants. 
The right to self-representation in prac-
tice protects the interest of defendants in pre-
senting their cases as effectively as possible. 
Indeed, for indigent defendants who have 
been appointed unskilled or inept counsel 
and for defendants seeking to assert ideologi-
cal defenses, the right to self-representation 
stands as the bulwark protecting the defen-
dant from an unfair trial. 
In short, the data expose the fallacy of the 
prevailing view of pro se felony defendants 
and demonstrate that the right to self-repre-
sentation in fact serves a vital role in protect-
ing the rights of criminal defendants.  ■
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Table 3: Pro Se Defendants’ Most Serious Lead Charge in Federal Court
End notes  
1  Data on state court defendants come from the National Archive of Criminal Justice Data, State Court Processing 
Statistics, 1990-2000: Felony Defendants in Large Urban Counties. A complete description of the database and the 
methodology for collection of the data is available at http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/NACJD. 
2  The federal court data come from the Federal Justice Statistics Resource Center, Defendants in Federal Criminal Cases 
Terminated in U.S. District Court, http://fjsrc.urban.org/index.cfm (follow “Download” hyperlink; submit name 
and e-mail address; then follow “Standard Analysis Files” hyperlink). 
3  These figures come from a database I compiled comprised of information from the publicly available docket sheets of 
208 pro se felony defendants in federal court.
   *   Twelve of the cases included in the federal docketing database included more than one pro se defendant (the number of pro se co-defendants in those cases ranged from two to 10).  In order to prevent multiple co-defendants in the 
same case from skewing the data on the type of case, for the purposes of Table 3, each entry represents only one case, rather than counting each defendant separately.  Therefore, there are only 177 entries included in this table.   
Drug Offenses
Escape
Fraudulent Property Offenses
Other Property Offenses
Immigration Offenses
Public Order - Racketeering & Extortion
Public Order - Non-Violent Sex Offenses
Public Order - Failure to Appear
Public Order - Perjury, Contempt & Intimidation
Public Order - Tax Offenses
Public Order - Other Non-Regulatory
Public Order - Other Regulatory
Threats on the President
Robbery
Weapons
 2.3%  (4/177)
 15.8%  (28/177)
 1.7%  (3/177)
 31.6%  (56/177)
 1.1%  (2/177)
 6.2%  (11/177)
 8.5%  (15/177)
 1.7%  (3/177)
 0.6%  (1/177)
 1.7%  (3/177)
 9.0%  (16/177)
 1.1%  (2/177)
 1.1%  (2/177)
 1.1%  (2/177)
 4.5%  (8/177)
 11.3%  (20/177)
 0.5%
 41.7%
 0.7%
17.5%
 3.5%
 17.1%
 1.3%
 0.8%
    --
 0.5%
 0.7%
 0.4%
 0.8%
 0.04%
 2.3%
 9.3%
Pro Se
Cases*
Represented Felony
Defendants FY 2002**
Assaults
**   The data in this column reflect the most serious lead charges for defendants in criminal cases terminated in fiscal year 2002.  See Compendium of Federal Justice Statistics, 2002 at 58.  I eliminated some categories of charges 
because none of the pro se cases involved those charges, and the percentages therefore do not total 100 percent. 
